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THE EMERGENCE OF CLASSICAL 
AMERICAN PATENT LAW 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, American legislatures and courts conceived of 
the patent as an active tool of economic growth. Patents were issued to both 
inventors and “promoters” who promised to deploy technology that had already 
been invented. In the 1830s a much more classical conception of the patent emerged, 
as a property right pure and simple. Questions about whether and how to employ 
patents were lodged almost entirely with their owners, who even acquired the power 
to keep patented technology off the market, precisely contrary to what the original 
Framers had in mind. An essential part of this development was the rise of federal 
patent exclusivity—a result that was not mandated by the text of the Constitution's 
IP Clause. Only federal exclusivity could limit the power of the states to grant 
unwarranted exclusive rights to favored grantees. The result was a regime in which 
Congress acquired the exclusive power to award patents for inventions, while state 
law largely controlled post-issuance commerce in patents. Changes in U.S. patent 
law under the 1836 Patent Act and later were driven by the classical belief that 
monopoly undermines economic growth, with invention as a narrow exception. This 
entailed two requirements: (1) the conditions for obtaining a patent be narrow, 
limited to actual inventions within the applicant's possession, and adequately 
disclosed; and (2) patent issuance had to be made a nonpolitical, administrative 
action. Together these requirements led both Congress and the courts away from 
relatively open ended policy concerns, and toward technical specification and 
boundary clarity. The result was a patent system increasingly detached from 
questions about economic development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One enduring debate about the ideological origins of the U.S. Constitution 
concerns whether it reflected and gave effect to a “classical” theory of statecraft. 
Richard Epstein has argued forcefully that the Constitution was created as a 
“classical liberal” document but was hijacked after a century and a half by 
“progressives.”1 I believe that this characterization is historically mistaken. The 
Constitution as written both tolerated and embraced a significant amount of state 
intervention. That was also true of contemporaneous state constitutions. They began 
to be interpreted more classically only during the 1830s and after.2 
As used here, the terms “classical” or “classical liberal” refer to a theory of 
the State that maximizes the role of private markets and minimizes the role of 
government in economic affairs. Some advocates believe this classicism rests on a 
conception of an a priori social contract, in which each participant agreed to be 
governed but also agreed to give up as few individual rights as possible.3 Others, 
                                                                                                                
 1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 45–73 (2014). 
 2. Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
1 (2015) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution]. For a response, see 
Richard A. Epstein, Rediscovering the Classical Liberal Constitution: A Reply to Professor 
Hovenkamp, 101 IOWA L. REV. 55 (2015). 
 3. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 20; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY (1962); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About 
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including myself, believe that the conception of a social contract barely influenced 
American constitutional thought, including that of the Framers and even the 
advocates of substantive due process, which represented the high water mark for 
constitutional classicism.4 
The actual historical Constitution envisioned an active role for the 
government in promoting economic development. To be sure, that role was different 
from the one we envision today, with a large public budget, deficit spending, and 
numerous government agencies. Rather, pre-classical theories of economic 
development advocated for heavy government contribution to private entrepreneurs 
to encourage construction of infrastructure and technology. This included tax 
exemptions, bounties, or guarantees of profitability through the creation of exclusive 
or monopoly rights. 
Constitutional classicists came to reject this view of public involvement in 
the economy. The most central and powerful proposition of classical 
constitutionalism is that the government’s role in economic development should be 
minimal. First, private rights in property and contract exist prior to any community 
needs for development.5 Second, if a particular project is worthwhile, the market 
itself will make it occur. The only exception is a tiny subset of public goods.6 Third, 
when the government attempts to induce development by creating exclusive rights, 
tax benefits, or other perquisites, politics inevitably distorts the decision-making. 
The result is excessive creation, with a bias favoring politically-well-placed interest 
groups.7 
Whatever value classicism may have as a theory of statecraft, it was not a 
part of the historical Constitution nor of its dominant early interpreters. To the extent 
classicists made their views known at the time, they were resoundingly rejected.8 
Only with the rise of the Jackson era in the 1820s and 1830s did constitutional 
interpretation begin to become more classical through a series of doctrinal changes 
that stretched across the balance of the nineteenth century. These included a 
repudiation of Marshall era Commerce Clause9 and Contract Clause jurisprudence,10 
and the development and short life of the constitutional doctrine that taxes may be 
assessed only for a “public purpose.”11 Also included was the rise of inverse 
condemnation doctrine in the 1870s, largely under state constitutions, which limited 
economic development or ensured that it would pay the costs it imposed upon 
                                                                                                                
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
953, 953 (2007) (seeking to locate patent law within social contract). 
 4. Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, supra note 2, at 40–51. 
 5. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 20. 
 6. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 592 (1871) (Appleton, 
C.J.) (“Capital naturally gravitates to the best investment. If a particular place or a special 
kind of manufacture promises large returns, the capitalist will be little likely to hesitate in 
selecting the place and in determining upon the manufacture.”). 
 7. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 22; see also Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical 
Constitution, supra note 2, at 19–29. 
 8. See Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, supra note 2, at 7–11. 
 9. Id. at 14–18. 
 10. Id. at 19–26. 
 11. Id. at 27–30. 
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others.12 The capstone was the rise of substantive due process or “liberty of 
contract,” initially in the state courts but later migrating to federal courts. Many of 
these changes did not occur until after the Civil War. 
Most writing about this constitutional history has ignored the patent 
system.13 That oversight needs to be addressed. The constitutional provisions 
historically most concerned with the role of government in economic development 
were the Commerce Clause,14 the Contract Clause,15 and the Patent, or Intellectual 
Property, Clause.16 These clauses were interpreted to address the ways that 
governmental power over the economy should be allocated between the federal 
government and the individual states. For patent law, a century and a half of federal 
supremacy has obscured that fact. 
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause17 was also relevant to economic 
development. For nearly all of the nineteenth century, however, it applied only to 
the federal government and was concerned almost exclusively with the exercise of 
eminent domain power for such things as rights of way. Only in the 1870s did state 
courts interpreting their own constitutions become much more involved in ensuring 
that state-sanctioned economic development paid its full costs, even if eminent 
domain or unwanted entry were not involved.18 
Historically, Supreme Court decisions interpreting both the Contract 
Clause and Patent Clause considered whether government-created exclusive rights 
could be used to encourage development. States had the power to issue monopoly 
grants already during the colonial era, and neither the Articles of Confederation nor 
the Constitution took that power away. Under the Articles of Confederation, which 
were in force from 1781 until the Constitution was ratified in 1789, the federal 
government had no power to issue patents. The states issued exclusive rights in 
corporate charters and for patented inventions more or less interchangeably.19 Today 
we do not think of the exclusive right created by a patent and the exclusive franchise 
given to a railroad to operate between two points as having many similarities. But 
this was not always so. 
                                                                                                                
 12. Id. at 30–39. 
 13. While histories of Anglo-American patent law have been written, they have 
generally not attempted to place the patent system within a general framework of American 
constitutional history. See, e.g., BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND 
COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (1967) (“It does not appear from the record whether this grant, awarded 
in England, was merely a contract, an importation franchise, or the first patent of invention 
relating to the American colonies.”); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the 
United States Patent Law: Antecedents, (5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 615 
(1996) [hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents]; see also SEAN BOTTOMLEY, THE BRITISH 
PATENT SYSTEM DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1700–1852: FROM PRIVILEGE TO 
PROPERTY (2014); CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE 
ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800 (2002). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 15. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 16. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. Id. amend. V. 
 18. Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, supra note 2, at 37–39. 
 19. Id. at 19–26. 
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From the colonial era until the Jackson era, American legislatures and 
courts conceived of the patent as an active tool of economic development. States, in 
particular, granted patents in anticipation that the grantee would actually develop 
some work of public improvement. This conception of the patent was distinctly “pre-
classical” in the sense that it envisioned considerable state involvement in ensuring 
that granted patents were actually used in socially beneficial ways. In addition, state 
patents, but not federal patents, were issued to “promoters”—that is, to those who 
had not really invented anything new, but rather promised to install technology or 
infrastructure in a new place.20 
A few decades later a much more classical conception of the patent 
emerged, as a property right, pure and simple. Questions about whether and how to 
employ a patent were lodged almost entirely with its owner, who at the high point 
of patent classicism even had the power to use patents to keep technology off the 
market—precisely contrary to what the original Framers of the provision had in 
mind.21 
One important consequence of this change was that the link between 
patents and government involvement in economic development was broken. That 
development haunts patent law to this day, giving us formal patent doctrine that is 
largely indifferent to how patents affect economic progress in particular markets. 
Instead, patent lawyers and judges behave much more like old fashioned property 
lawyers, generally obsessed with validity of title or location of boundaries, but rarely 
considering broader questions about the relationship between the patent system and 
economic growth. Beginning in the 1890s, first state and later federal law reacted 
against important elements of this patent classicism, mainly by imposing limits on 
patent licensing. But these negative provisions were intended to limit monopolistic 
power and abuse. They never came close to restoring the affirmative developmental 
obligations inherent in the original patent system.22 
I. THE CHANGING CONCEPTION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT 
The earliest American patents for inventions were a far cry from the private 
property rights model that predominates today. Historically, the American colonies 
and later the states viewed the patent as an active policy tool for economic 
development. Just as the early American states viewed corporate charters as granting 
private entrepreneurs a special right or privilege to induce the creation of 
infrastructure,23 the patent was an inducement to introduce useful technology. Under 
this model both corporate charters and initially patents were granted selectively to 
private developers who promised to furnish the state with something that would 
contribute economic growth or infrastructure. Grantees tended to be well 
established, both economically and politically. 
Prior to the first federal Patent Act passed under the U.S. Constitution, 
patents were issued exclusively by colonial and later state legislatures. The 
                                                                                                                
 20. See infra discussion at Section II.A. 
 21. See infra discussion at Sections II.A, II.B. 
 22. See infra discussion at Section II.H. 
 23. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 
17–41 (1991) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE]. 
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legislative grant that is sometimes identified as the earliest American patent was 
issued by the colony of Massachusetts Bay in 1641, giving Samuel Winslow an 
exclusive right to use a certain process to make salt. The originator of the grant was 
the Massachusetts General Court, which was the colony’s legislative body.24 
Winslow apparently had planned to protect his process as a trade secret, but then 
agreed to disclose it in exchange for a ten-year exclusive right from the General 
Court.25 The patent was conditioned on the patentee’s actual establishment of salt 
works employing the patented method within one year of issuance. In addition, it 
expressly placed no limits on the ability of outsiders to import salt into the colony. 
At least half a dozen colonies issued patents prior to the Revolution, 
although the number was relatively small.26 The United States was then governed 
for seven years (1781–1788) by the Articles of Confederation, which did not grant 
the federal government any power to issue patents. Just as corporate charters, patents 
were granted directly by state legislatures and almost always for the purpose of 
facilitating specific works of public improvement.27 
The first federal Patent Act, enacted in 1790, required applicants to provide 
a written description, together with drafts or models distinguishing the applicant’s 
invention from prior art. The applicant had to petition the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of War, and the Attorney General,28 who were required to examine the 
application, and then at least two had to agree that the patent should issue. The 
statute provided almost nothing in the way of substantive or procedural review 
standards. This system proved to be extremely cumbersome, and only 57 patents 
issued under the Act.29 The substantially revised 1793 Act simplified the process, 
eliminating substantive government review and requiring only registration by the 
applicant. While approval by the Secretary of State was required, review was limited 
to ensuring that the application was in good order.30 The statute gave the Secretary 
no authority to examine prior art or assess the proposed invention based on novelty, 
                                                                                                                
 24. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN HANDBOOK RELATING TO PATENTS, CAVEATS, DESIGNS, 
TRADE-MARKS, ETC. 42 (rev. ed. 1908). 
 25. BUGBEE, supra note 13, at 58. 
 26. See Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent System: The Past is Prologue, 67 ABA 
J. 308, 310 (1981); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in 
Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 493–95 (2013); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the 
Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 61 & n.42 (2010); Walterscheid, Antecedents, 
supra note 13, at 630–61. 
 27. For a catalog, see Pasquale J. Federico, State Patents, 13 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166, 167–69 (1931) [hereinafter Federico, State Patents]. However, 
Federico’s article does not distinguish which of the many grants he describes were true 
inventions and which were promises to develop locally technologies that had already been 
invented. 
 28. During the brief period the 1790 Act was in force, Thomas Jefferson was 
Secretary of State, Henry Knox was Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph was Attorney 
General. Cabinet Members, MOUNT VERNON, http://mountvernon.org/digital-
encyclopedia/article/cabinet-members/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
 29. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–12 (1790); see also Pasquale 
J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 237, 
244–46 (1936). 
 30. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23 (1793). 
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usefulness, or any other factor outside of the application record. It also assessed 
treble damages for infringement, but damages were based on the “price, for which 
the patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said 
invention . . . .”31 That is, damages were available only if the patent was either in 
use by the inventor or licensed out to others. 
A senate report issued nearly 40 years later, upon passage of the heavily 
revised 1836 Patent Act, described patent granting under the 1793 Act as 
“promiscuous.”32 Nevertheless, this approach was largely consistent with 
Jefferson’s wish that, while the standard for patentability be high, actual 
administrative examination of patents be minimal, with questions of validity, 
including novelty, assessed mainly by the courts subsequent to patent issuance.33 
The result was a large disparity between patent issuance and validity, with patentees 
losing as many as 75% of litigated cases.34 
The Jacksonian coalition of the 1820s and 1830s opened the door through 
which economic classicism entered American public policy and constitutional 
thought.35 Andrew Jackson became the symbol for a diverse combination of social, 
economic, and religious outsiders, united mainly in their opposition to the insider 
Federalists and Whigs who had dominated national politics and business.36 For 
Jacksonians, both the liberal granting of exclusive privileges in corporate charters 
and the nearly unconstrained granting of patent rights were unacceptable. The 
Marshall Court’s strong interpretation of the Contract Clause largely forbad the 
states from reneging on privileges contained in corporate grants. Jacksonians 
increasingly saw these and other governmental privileges as creating a permanent 
class of economic elites, excluding everyone else.37 The problem with federal 
patents was that the grants were discretionary and egregiously excessive, 
inconsistent with the emergent classicism of the day that believed monopoly 
privileges should be highly exceptional. 
                                                                                                                
 31. Id. § 5. 
 32. See JOHN RUGGLES, SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE STATE AND 
CONDITION OF THE PATENT OFFICE, S. DOC. NO. 228, at 6 (1836). 
 33. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 40 
ESSAYS IN HIST. 3 (1998) [hereinafter Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 
1793], 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060907014252/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH40/
walter40.html. Most of the cases dealing with novelty issues actually concerned whether the 
patentee’s own specification distinguished what was novel about the invention. See Zorina 
Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. 
ECON. HIST. 58, 63 (1995); see also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS 
OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836 (1998); Steven 
Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 932 (1991). 
 34. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND 
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 78 (2013) (determining 
this number for the 1820s, although doubting its significance). 
 35. See Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 36. See CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 
1815–1846 (1991). 
 37. See Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, supra note 2, at 19–26; 
see also HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 23, at 17–41. 
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A. The Origins of Patent Exceptionalism 
Opposition to exclusive privilege became an increasingly powerful theme 
in American public law through the balance of the nineteenth century and well into 
the twentieth. One of its most enduring manifestations was the expansion of 
administrative agencies as an alternative to entrenched, conservative courts.38 One 
of its most important contributions was the general corporation acts of the 1830s, 
which entitled everyone who could meet statutory requirements to incorporate, 
typically under the oversight of the secretary of state. At the same time, however, 
the general incorporation acts took away most of a corporation’s special exclusive 
privileges.39 Beginning with the 1836 Patent Act, a second contribution was an 
increasingly administrative patent system, with objectively defined criteria of 
invention but only minimal involvement of government economic policy making.40 
The champion of the 1836 Act, Jacksonian Senator John Ruggles of Maine, later 
became known as the “father of the Patent Office.”41 One of the federal 
government’s early important uses of administrative process, first authorized by the 
Patent Act of 1836, was to limit the number of issued patents but in a way that was 
free of political influence.42 The federal patent then evolved into a “property right” 
that applicants could obtain through an administrative procedure intended to be 
politically neutral, and that patentees could practice or not at their will. 
As noted previously, pre-classical theories of economic development relied 
heavily on exclusive rights to create incentives. Patents were a special case of this 
general principle. For example, the patent provision contained in the original English 
Statute of Monopolies in 1623 was nothing more than an exception to a statute that 
limited the government’s power to grant monopoly franchises.43 Some of the 
American colonies emulated this provision. The Massachusetts Bodie of Liberties 
(1641), for example, provided that “[n]o monopolies shall be granted or allowed 
                                                                                                                
 38. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative 
Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1581 (2008). 
 39. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 23, at 11–16. 
 40. British law went through a similar change at about the same time. See ADRIAN 
JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES 248–50 
(2009); BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760–1911, at 103–12 (1999). 
 41. See G. H. K., The Father of the Patent Office, 64 SCI. AM. 295 (1891). 
 42. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). See infra discussion at Part II. 
 43. English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c.3, § 6: 
6 (a). Provided also, that any declaration before mentioned shall not 
extend to any letters patents (b) and grants of privilege for the term of 
fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or 
making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm (c) to the 
true and first inventor (d) and inventors of such manufactures, which 
others at the time of making such letters patents and grants shall not use 
(e), so as also they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state 
by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally 
inconvenient . . . .  
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amongst us, but of such new inventions that are profitable to the Country, and that 
for a short time.”44 
During the Jackson era, the patent gradually became rebranded as a set of 
“property” rights, which entailed two things. First was a more ministerial set of rules 
for determining when patents should be issued, effectively removing this power 
from direct, individual legislative action. Chief among these rules was the limitation 
of patents to “inventors,” plus criteria for defining inventorship.45 Second was the 
emerging idea that patents-as-property have the same protections that apply to rights 
in land or other traditional property. An important corollary was that, once they were 
issued, patents were subject to the management of their owners but relatively free 
from other government control. The decision to make productive use of the 
innovation represented in a patent became purely private, emulating the law of real 
property. One cannot lose title simply through nonuse, and patent ownership creates 
no “social” obligations. Licensing and most other post-issuance practices were 
regulated, if at all, under state contract and commercial law. 
With this change in legal profile, the American patent largely managed to 
escape the hostility toward monopoly and abhorrence of regulation that increased 
dramatically after the 1830s. Most of that hostility was directed at state legislative 
grants or private business, but not at federal patent grants. The success of this 
transformation is underscored by the fact that the early twentieth century represented 
not only the height of substantive due process doctrine, with its exaggerated fears of 
state created monopoly,46 but also the high point of patent exceptionalism. Supreme 
Court patent decisions such as E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. (1902)47 
and Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. (1908),48 written during 
the heyday of Lochner-style hostility toward state-created monopolies, permitted 
cartelization of patented products and allowed patentees to enforce unused patents 
in such a way as to keep technology off the market rather than facilitate its 
development. 
Through this process, patent law became much more privatized and 
divorced from government policy toward economic development. While such 
concerns were still articulated, they were increasingly relegated to boilerplate. The 
government’s job was increasingly seen as limited to defining patent property rights, 
with questions about development and use left entirely to their private owners. As a 
result the patent system evolved into a remarkably different enterprise from, say, 
                                                                                                                
 44. Massachusetts Bodie of Liberties, ¶ 9 (1641), 
http://www.bartleby.com/43/8.html; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, 
Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
983, 1004 (2013) (referring to Massachusetts Bodie of Liberties (1641) and similar legislation 
passed by Connecticut in 1672). 
 45. See infra discussion at Section II.B. 
 46. See e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, 
at 243–62 (2015) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, OPENING]. 
 47. 186 U.S. 70, 88–90 (1902) (permitting product price fixing in patent cross-
licensing agreement); see infra text accompanying note 131. 
 48. 210 U.S. 405 (1908) (permitting owner of unused patent to use infringement 
suit to shut down rival’s competing technology); see infra text accompanying notes 132–43. 
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antitrust law, which even in litigation devotes considerable empirical resources to 
identifying and distinguishing the effects of particular practices in the markets where 
they occur.49 The main reason this is true is that antitrust never turned into a property 
rights system, but rather gleaned its sources from economics as well as the common 
law of contracts and torts. For better or worse, it remained much more responsive to 
policy making about growth and development. Its coverage could both expand and 
contract without compensation to business persons adversely affected by a change 
in the law. 
B. Federal Exclusivity 
An essential part of the development outlined above was the rise of federal 
patent exclusivity—a result not mandated by the text of the Constitution’s Patent 
Clause. The sources of increased hostility toward state patents were twofold. First 
was the view that state-issued patents burdened interstate commerce. For example, 
the Supreme Court struck down the New York steamboat patent under the dormant 
Commerce Clause as preempted by federal legislation,50 not under the Patent Clause 
as usurpation of an exclusive federal power.51 Second, however, only federal 
exclusivity could effectively limit the power of the states to grant unwarranted 
exclusive rights to favored grantees. The eventual result was a regime in which 
Congress acquired the exclusive power to award patents for inventions. 
While state-issued patents largely disappeared from the economic 
landscape during the Jackson era, the legal question of federal exclusivity was 
unsettled in the United States until the 1960s, more than a century later. In 1963 
neither the Supreme Court nor the government as amicus curiae could cite a single 
case for the proposition that federal patent power preempted state patent law. The 
Government’s brief in Day-Brite, decided in 1964, conceded that it knew “of no case 
in this Court specifically dealing with the question.” Nor was there any federal 
statute on point.52 The Supreme Court responded with a judge-made exclusivity rule, 
relying on the need for federal uniformity and not even mentioning the Tenth 
Amendment. 
While drafting the first Patent Act in 1790, members of Congress 
vigorously debated whether federal patents could be given to mere importers of 
foreign technology, with a consensus emerging that such a provision exceeded 
Congressional power under the Patent clause.53 States, however, retained the power 
to offer other types of exclusive rights. These were given mainly in corporate 
                                                                                                                
 49. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 496 (2015) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Reexamination]. 
 50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 What.) 1, 221 (1824). 
 51. See infra text accompanying notes 94–95, 193. 
 52. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21–22 n.11, Compco Corp. v. 
Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (No. 106), 1963 WL 105793, at *21 n.11 (noting 
the debate over the issue in Gibbons and Chief Justice Marshall’s refusal to decide the issue). 
 53. The debate is recounted in Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General 
Welfare Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 109–10 
(1999). 
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charters, and often to entrepreneurs who had not actually invented anything but 
rather who promised to deploy technology that had been developed elsewhere.54 
II. CLASSICAL PATENT LAW 
Mid-nineteenth century changes in the legal concept of the patent moved 
away from an “involved” government toward the view that private control would 
achieve optimal development, provided that the issuance process was kept free of 
capture and that contract and property rights were protected. The federal process of 
patent issuance became increasingly administrative, restricted to true inventors as 
determined by objective criteria intended to be nonpolitical. In the process, the 
patent began to change from an express element of economic development into a 
property right, pure and simple. 
A. The Patent in Classical Political Economy 
Beginning with Adam Smith, classical political economists and other 
policy writers became highly critical of the general system of encouraging 
development through the creation of monopoly rights. They believed that capital 
would gravitate naturally to investments that were destined to be profitable, and 
special state inducements were unnecessary.55 They also complained repeatedly that, 
whatever the ideal vision of statecraft inherent in the monopoly granting process, it 
always resulted in excessive largesse to favored interested groups. More often than 
not, both corporate charters and patents were given to those who were politically 
well placed, and those not so favored were left to labor in the more competitive 
markets that remained.56 
Patents managed to find a small place in the writings of classical political 
economists, provided their scope was sufficiently constrained and the granting 
process free from special interest control. For example, Adam Smith acknowledged 
the value of patents, but not with much enthusiasm. His Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
written about 15 years before The Wealth of Nations, found exclusive rights 
generally to be “greatly prejudicial to society.”57 However, he found the British 14-
year exclusive right for patented inventions to be “harmless enough.”58 The Wealth 
of Nations itself says very little on the subject of patents, other than Smith’s repeated 
objections to exclusive rights.59 Smith also observed that “pecuniary rewards” such 
as bounties for valuable inventions were a way to encourage innovation, but in 
practice they would require the state to place a value on them, and this would “hardly 
                                                                                                                
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 75–81. 
 55. See Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
 56. Id. at 21–26. 
 57. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R. L. Meek et al. eds., 1976) 
[hereinafter SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE], 
http://www.portalconservador.com/livros/Adam-Smith-Lectures-on-Jurisprudence.pdf 
(undated, but delivered between 1762 and 1766). 
 58. Id. 
 59. ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, bk. I, ch. 10, §§ 72, 80 (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS]; see also 
id. bk. IV, ch. 8, §17 (speaking of “absurd and oppressive monopolies”). 
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ever be so precisely proportioned to the merit of the invention.”60 By contrast, 
exclusivity for a limited term plus the right to license would create rewards based 
on market evaluation. 
Smith’s denigration of patents might seem surprising, given the broad 
scope of The Wealth of Nations, which covered what we would today call both 
macro- and microeconomic topics, and with a strong focus on trade and commerce. 
Further, Smith’s writing coincided with the start of the English Industrial 
Revolution, which began in the 1760s and spread to continental Europe and 
America.61 Smith certainly did not see a strong link between the Industrial 
Revolution and any protection that the British patent system had to offer. 
Thomas Jefferson’s position on patents was not that far from Smith’s. 
Jefferson was one of the relatively few Founding Fathers who studied Smith closely 
in the late-eighteenth century, although he was probably more influenced by other 
writers in the Scottish classical economic tradition, such as Francis Hutcheson.62 
Jefferson shared Smith’s views about the need for a small, relatively uninvolved 
state and had the same preferences for an agrarian, rather than industrial, society. 
Like Smith and Hutcheson, Jefferson was unenthusiastic about patents but willing 
to tolerate them.63 
Classical political economy began to take serious hold in the United States 
in the 1830s.64 American political economists in the classical tradition, such as 
                                                                                                                
 60. SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 57. Smith’s complete 
statement is: 
The greatest part however of exclusive priviledges are the creatures of 
the civil constitutions of the country. The greatest part of these are greatly 
prejudicial to society. Some indeed are harmless enough. Thus the 
inventor of a new machine or any other invention has the exclusive 
priviledge of making and vending that invention for the space of 14 years 
by the law of this country, as a reward for his ingenuity, and it is probable 
that this is as equall an one as could be fallen upon. For if the legislature 
should appoint pecuniary rewards for the inventors of new machines, etc., 
they would hardly ever be so precisely proportiond to the merit of the 
invention as this is. 
Id. This passage is discussed in H. I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 
DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750–1852, at 19 (1984). 
 61. See PETER N. STEARNS, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY 21–
40 (4th ed. 2013). 
 62. Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception Among the American 
Founders, 1776–1790, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 897 (2002). On Hutcheson’s influence on 
Jefferson, see GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 195–210, 233–44 (rev. ed. 2002). Francis Hutcheson was an older 
contemporary of Adam Smith who spent much of his career at Glasgow. 
 63. WILLS, supra note 62, at 234–35; see also Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and 
the Patent Act of 1793, supra note 33. Jefferson’s substantive views on patent law, particularly 
his concerns about lack of novelty or obvious subject matter, are recounted in Graham v. John 
Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7–12 (1966). 
 64. HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 23, at 11–16, 183–92. 
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Brown University’s Francis Wayland, did not move far from Smith’s position on 
patents. Wayland simultaneously railed against the evils of exclusive grants 
generally, but made a limited exception for exclusive rights for limited times for 
patents and copyrights.65 By and large, however, these were passing observations, 
and there was little sustained discussion of patent rights. Indeed, one striking feature 
of Anglo-American economics generally is the small amount of attention devoted to 
the patent system until the early decades of the twentieth century. Only in the 1930s 
did economists such as Arnold Plant at the London School of Economics and 
Edward Chamberlin at Harvard begin to incorporate patents into their theories of 
business economics.66 
After 1830, both Congress and American judges attempted to forge a patent 
system that simultaneously rejected the pre-classical idea that monopoly was a 
useful general tool for encouraging enterprise, but also embraced a narrow and 
increasingly technical exception for inventors. They did this, first, by seeking to 
ensure that patent grants were limited to true inventions and not granted too liberally. 
Second, they reconceptualized the issued patent as a property right, similar to land 
grants, which entered the stream of commerce once they were created but thereafter 
received little government oversight other than protection of title and boundaries. 
Further, they were purely “private” in the sense that ownership did not require use 
or any other sharing with the public. These changes also served to remove the patent 
system from the stigma of state-created monopoly. 
Smith was just as critical of business corporations as he was of the patent 
system. He opposed large aggregations of private power and believed that 
corporations (“joint stock companies”), as managers of “other people’s money,” 
were doomed to inefficiency and abuse.67 Thomas Jefferson shared many of these 
views, which he derived from Smith, and strongly favored a nation of small farmers 
and yeomen.68 By contrast, the classical statecraft that emerged in the United States 
in the 1830s under Andrew Jackson’s administration was much more 
entrepreneurial. Rather than abolishing the business corporation, Jacksonian states 
democratized it by making the business corporate form available to everyone as a 
matter of administrative law and attempting to remove any hint of special privilege 
or monopoly right.69 
                                                                                                                
 65. See, e.g., FRANCIS WAYLAND, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 27 (1837) 
(supporting patents and copyrights); id. at 69 (generally discussing the evils of exclusive 
grants). 
 66. Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 
ECONOMICA 30, 30–51 (1934); see also EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION 57–67, 111–12 (1933); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 46, at 78–79, 198–
205. 
 67. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 59, at bk. V, ch. 1, § 107. 
 68. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164–65 (W. Peden 
ed., 1955) (1775); DREW MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC POLITICAL ECONOMY IN 
JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 175 (1980). 
 69. HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 23 at 11–17; Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634 (1988). 
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B. State vs. Federal Patenting Power: Promoters vs. Inventors 
The Constitution’s Patent Clause gives Congress the power to issue patents 
but says nothing about whether that power is exclusive. Further, the Tenth 
Amendment provides that the states retain any power not granted to Congress.70 The 
patenting power in the federal Constitution is also expressly restricted to “inventors” 
and only for “discoveries.”71 Justice Marshall’s 1818 opinion for the Supreme Court 
in Evans v. Eaton categorically rejected the patentee’s argument that under the 
federal Patent Act it was “not necessary for the patentee to show himself to be the 
first inventor or discoverer.”72 He was entitled to a patent if he invented something, 
not knowing about prior art, “although it may have been previously discovered by 
some other person.”73 Roughly a third of patent validity challenges during the period 
1800–1839 were based on lack of novelty.74 
By contrast, pre-classical theories of economic growth were much more 
focused on “developers,” or entrepreneurs. What was important was not so much 
who had invented something, but rather who promised to deploy it to public 
advantage. In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, states frequently 
granted patents and monopoly charters to firms that had not invented anything but 
had promised to build something with existing technology, such as a bridge or a 
steamboat line. Historically, if a grantee failed to construct or operate the thing 
contemplated by the grant, the legislative body could withdraw it. Today, by 
contrast, a patent is valid and enforceable, at least by damage actions, even if the 
patentee never puts the patent into practice.75 
In addition, the right to exclude in a patent is specific to a technology 
described therein. By contrast, a monopoly right in a corporate charter was typically 
geographic, such as giving a private corporation the exclusive right to maintain a 
toll bridge for a specified distance in either direction.76 The scope of invention or 
technology was not an issue. For example, some early decisions considered such 
questions as whether the exclusive right to operate a toll bridge over a river at a 
certain point served to exclude those who crossed over the frozen ice in winter by 
either walking or driving a sleigh.77 The issue was not infringement of any 
technology embodied in the bridge, but simply crossing the river—by any means—
                                                                                                                
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 71. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the 
Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s 
Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1816–45 (2006) (arguing that the clause 
limited federal power to grant IP rights to these categories). 
 72. 16 U.S. 454, 513–14 (1818). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Khan, supra note 33, at 78. 
 75. E.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 388 (2006). 
 76. Cases involving statutory bridge monopolies for prescribed distances include 
Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51, 51–82 (1865); Wash. Toll-Bridge Co. v. Comm’rs 
of Beaufort, 81 N.C. 491, 499 (1879); Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smitch 30 N.Y. 44 (1864); see 
also ELIZABETH B. MONROE, THE WHEELING BRIDGE CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY (1992). 
 77. See, e.g., Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (denying 
recovery). 
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within the proscribed distance. State-granted patents often combined these 
technological and geographic limitations without distinguishing them. 
State-issued patents required a geographic limitation if for no other reason 
than states had no authority to interfere with congressional power over interstate 
commerce. This became clear after the Supreme Court’s 1824 decision in Gibbons 
v. Ogden, discussed below.78 The New York-issued steamboat patent in that 
controversy extended to ports at the state’s outer boundaries. This prompted 
complaints by people from New Jersey and Connecticut who claimed they could not 
travel to New York by steamboat, because no boat line was capable of operating in 
two or more states. Thus Gibbons became the classic case of state interference with 
interstate commerce. 
Commerce Clause issues aside, the Constitution’s Framers very likely did 
not intend to eliminate all state-issued patents.79 The predominant early 
interpretation was that the Patent Clause gave Congress the right to reward 
“inventors” with exclusive rights, while permitting the individual states to create 
such rights for other reasons, including grants to noninventor developers. St. George 
Tucker, editor of the first American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (1803), 
understood the Patent Clause to mean that “the states may possess some degree of 
concurrent right within their respective territories.” State patent grants would 
become rare, however, because they could not provide protection beyond their 
borders, while United States patents extended nationwide. “[I]t is scarcely probable 
that the protection of the laws of any particular state will hereafter be resorted 
to . . . .”80 As late as the 1830s, Joseph Story agreed in his Commentaries on the 
Constitution, concluding that while state patent grants continued to be lawful they 
would be much less appealing than a United States patent.81 Neither author 
acknowledged that the power to create local monopolies within a single state could 
still be quite valuable. 
Consistent with the constitutional limitation, all federal patent acts have 
restricted patent grants to inventors. The first act, passed in 1790, limited its 
protection to those who “have invented or discovered” something “useful and 
important.”82 The statute also required a written description of the invention, as well 
as a model of the invention if practicable.83 It said nothing about the power of the 
states to issue patents. The Second Patent Act of 1793 clarified the novelty 
requirement, stating “that simply changing the form or the proportions of any 
machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a 
                                                                                                                
 78. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221 (1824). See infra text accompanying notes 87–94. 
 79. See Federico, State Patents, supra note 27, at 167–69; 175–77; see also 
BUGBEE, supra note 13, at 102. 
 80. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 265 (1803). Volume one of Tucker’s 
Blackstone contains a lengthy Appendix, mainly on the U.S. Constitution. 
 81. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1147 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1970) (1833) (“The states could not separately make 
effectual provision for either of the cases.”). 
 82. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (1790). 
 83. Id. § 2. 
278 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:263 
discovery.”84 The Second Patent Act also made clear that the patent’s written 
description had to be sufficient to enable someone skilled in the art to make or use 
it.85 Moreover, it did not preclude the states from issuing patents, although it did 
provide that someone who owned a state patent issued before that state had ratified 
the Constitution could obtain a United States patent on the same thing only by 
relinquishing the state patent.86 
By tying the federal patent exclusively to inventors, the U.S. Constitution 
effectively divided the territory of government-sanctioned exclusive rights. 
Granting of exclusive rights in corporate charters remained largely a function of the 
states. Gradually, however, the power to grant exclusive rights for inventions came 
to be seen as a federal prerogative. Even in the 1820s and 1830s, judges believed 
that, while federal power to recognize true invention might be exclusive, the power 
to grant exclusive rights to developers and promoters continued to reside with the 
states. As the state court decision in Gibbons v. Ogden described it: 
Patents under the laws of the United States, can be granted only 
for new inventions and discoveries. In Great Britain, patents are 
granted not only for new inventions, but for improvements 
imported from abroad. This state has reserved to itself the precious 
and very important power of encouraging art and science, by 
granting exclusive rights to use improvements introduced from 
foreign states.87 
In his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story argued that 
while the congressional power to grant patents was limited to inventors, the states 
retained the power to grant an exclusive right to “the possessor or introducer of an 
art or invention, who does not claim to be an inventor, but has merely introduced it 
from abroad . . . .”88 
                                                                                                                
 84. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 318–23 (1793). 
 85. Id. § 3, stating that the applicant: 
shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of 
using, or process or compounding the same, in such full, clear and exact 
terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known, and 
to enable any person skilled in the art or science . . . to make, compound, 
and use the same. 
Id. 
 86. Id. § 7 (“[W]here any state, before its adoption of the present form of 
government, shall have granted an exclusive right to any invention, the party, claiming that 
right, shall not be capable of obtaining an exclusive right under this act, but on relinquishing 
his right under such particular state . . . .”). 
 87. Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488, 504 (N.Y. 1820), rev’d on other grounds, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). While reversing on Commerce Clause grounds, the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to decide any issues pertaining to state authority to grant patents. See 
also Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 520 (N.Y. 1812) (noting that the steamboat patent 
in suit was “not founded on original invention”). 
 88. STORY, supra note 81, at § 1149. 
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C. State-Issued Patents 
After the Revolution but prior to ratification of the Constitution, patents 
were issued exclusively by individual states, and only by legislative enactment. John 
Fitch’s first steamboat patent, probably the best known of post-Revolutionary state 
patents, was created by a special legislative grant from the state of New York in 
1787, when the states were still governed by the Articles of Confederation. It granted 
“the sole and exclusive right and privilege of making and using boats, propelled by 
fire or steam, within the waters of New York State.”89 
The scope of the Fitch grant, covering all “boats propelled by fire or 
steam,” was both extremely nonspecific as to the technology and much broader than 
anything Fitch had actually invented.90 At the time he had nothing more than some 
drawings. Nevertheless, the New York court sustained the patent against a claim 
that:  
The grant in question is not of the exclusive right of a propelling 
power applied to machinery of an ascertained construction; but is 
a grant of the propelling power at large, wherever it is possible to 
create it on the waters of the state, if applied to the purpose of 
navigating vessels.91 
States continued to issue patents after the U.S. Constitution was ratified. In 
1798, New York gave Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton a second patent to make 
and operate steamboats for up to 30 years.92 Just as the Fitch patent, the 
Livingston/Fulton patent was a special grant of the New York legislature.93 
Interestingly, when the U.S. Supreme Court eventually struck down a portion of this 
grant in Gibbons v. Ogden, it relied on the negative implications of the Commerce 
Clause. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion refused to consider whether either the 
                                                                                                                
 89. Livingston, 9 Johns. at 507–08. As the decision quoted the complaint: 
That on the 19th of March, 1787, the legislature of the state of New-York 
passed an act . . . that the said John Fitch, his heirs, administrators and 
assigns, should be, and they were thereby vested with the sole and 
exclusive right and privilege of constructing, making, using, employing 
and navigating, all and every species or kinds of boats, or water craft, 
which might be urged or impelled through the water, by the force of fire 
or steam, in all creeks, rivers, bays and waters whatsoever, within the 
territory and jurisdiction of this state, for and during the full end and term 
of fourteen years from and after the then present session of the 
legislature . . .  
Id. 
 90. This is largely supported by the fact that several other states also issued 
geographically exclusive patents for steamboats. For a broad catalog, see Federico, State 
Patents, supra note 27, at 169–72. 
 91. Livingston, 9 Johns. at 516. 
 92. Id.; see also Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 52 (2013) [hereinafter Hrdy, State Patent Laws]. 
 93. Livingston, 9 Johns. at 507. 
280 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:263 
Constitution’s Patent Clause or the federal Patent Act preempted state-issued 
patents.94 A year later, a New York court struck down the entire grant, once again 
under the Commerce Clause, holding that Justice Marshall’s strong “affecting 
commerce” language in Gibbons95 served to invalidate significant portions of the 
exclusive grant even as applied to purely intrastate routes.96 
The steamboat patent history makes clear that the New York legislature 
was much less interested in rewarding inventors than in using monopoly grants to 
promote economic development. It wanted a set of working commercial steamboat 
lines. First, as part of his application to the legislature, Fitch was required to 
demonstrate the “great immediate utility and the important advantages” that would 
result from his invention. This included a lengthy description of the social benefits 
that would accrue, particularly in western watercourses that had been difficult to 
navigate.97 Second, his patent was regarded as a legal commitment to deploy. 
Unfortunately, Fitch never developed the promised steamboat or routes. 
Several years later, with Fitch’s steamboats nowhere in view, Fulton and 
Livingston demonstrated an actual working steamboat to the New York legislature.98 
It responded by revoking Fitch’s patent for nonuse and issuing a second patent to 
Fulton and Livingston.99 Fulton’s and Livingston’s own status as inventors is also 
open to dispute. They had made a working model by copying liberally from Fitch’s 
design.100 Not until 1836 would federal law prevent the patenting of something that 
had been “described in any printed publication,” as Fitch’s drawings had been prior 
to the filing of the Fulton/Livingston application.101 Further, Fulton and Livingston 
also had to make several improvements to comply with additional obligations that 
the New York legislature assessed—namely, of boats displacing at least 20 tons and 
capable of going four miles per hour through the ordinary currents of the Hudson 
                                                                                                                
 94. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239 (1824) (“I have not touched upon 
the right of the States to grant patents for inventions or improvements, generally, because it 
does not necessarily arise in this cause. It is enough for all the purposes of this decision, if 
they cannot exercise it so as to restrain a free intercourse among the States.”). 
 95. On Marshall’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause to create federal power 
over activities “affecting commerce,” see Hovenkamp, Inventing Classical Constitution, 
supra note 2, at 14–19. 
 96. N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 1 Lock. Rev. Cas. 104 (N.Y. 1825). 
 97. WILLIAM THORNTON, SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF STEAMBOATS 13–14 
(1814); see also Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual 
Property 97–116 (June 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) 
[hereinafter Bracha, Owning Ideas], 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/obracha/dissertation/. 
 98. For an account of the demonstration and a drawing of the Clermont, the first 
working steamboat, see JOHN WARNER BARBER ET AL., HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK 340–42 (1842). 
 99. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 509 (N.Y. 1812). 
 100. Hrdy, State Patent Laws, supra note 92, at 78; see also Oren Bracha, The 
Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and Why We Should 
Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 243 (2004). 
 101. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Today, the printed 
publication rule is codified at 35 U.S.C. §102(b) (2012). 
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River, both upstream and downstream.102 Another clause in the grant provided that 
for each additional steamboat that the patentees actually deployed, their patent term 
would be extended by 5 additional years, up to a maximum of 30.103 Clearly the New 
York grant to Fulton and Livingston contemplated actual construction and use of 
steamboats, even specifying their minimum performance and creating inducements 
for increasing their number. The Fulton/Livingston patent represented a “contract to 
develop and deploy” rather than an “invention” in the modern sense. It was a product 
of intense bargaining with the legislature, which wanted steamboats of a specified 
capability to be deployed on New York waters. 
One of the reasons that both Justices Yates and Kent gave for upholding 
the state’s power to issue the patent was that the federal Constitution’s Patent Clause 
gave Congress the power to issue patents only to “authors and inventors.”104 They 
also noted that the Tenth Amendment mandated that anything not expressly given 
to Congress was reserved to the states.105 From that it followed that a state had the 
                                                                                                                
 102. Livingston, 9 Johns. at 509–10. 
 103. Id. at 511 (“[I]t was, among other things, enacted, that whenever Robert R. 
Livingston and Robert Fulton, and such persons as they may associate with them, should 
establish one or more steam-boats or vessels, other than that then already established, they 
should, for each and every such additional boat, be entitled to five years’ prolongation of their 
grant or contract with this state . . . .”). 
 104. Id. at 546. 
 105. Kent’s statement is worth quoting: 
If the grant is not inconsistent with the power of congress to regulate 
commerce, there is as little pretence to hold it repugnant to the power to 
grant patents. That power only secures, for a limited time, to authors and 
inventors the exclusive privilege to their writings and discoveries; and as 
it is not granted, by exclusive words, to the United States, nor prohibited 
to the individual states, it is a concurrent power which may be exercised 
by the states, in a variety of cases, without any infringement of the 
congressional power. A state cannot take away from an individual his 
patent right, and render it common to all the citizens. This would 
contravene the act of congress, and would be, therefore, unlawful. But if 
an author or inventor, instead of resorting to the act of congress, should 
apply to the legislature of this state for an exclusive right to his 
production, I see nothing to hinder the state from granting it, and the 
operation of the grant would, of course, be confined to the limits of this 
state. Within our own jurisdiction, it would be complete and perfect. . . . 
Congress may secure, for a limited time, an exclusive right throughout 
the union; but there is nothing in the constitution to take away from the 
states the power to enlarge the privilege within their respective 
jurisdictions. The states are not entirely devested of their original 
sovereignty over the subject matter; and whatever power has not been 
clearly granted to the union, remains with them. 
Id. at 581–82. Chancellor Kent also added this: 
The power of congress is only to ascertain and define the right of 
property; it does not extend to regulating the use of it. That must be 
exclusively of local cognisance. If the author’s book or print contains 
matter injurious to the public morals or peace, or if the inventor’s 
282 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:263 
power to grant a patent right to someone who was not an inventor but rather a 
developer or promoter. Speaking of the federal Patent Act, which by this time was 
more than 20 years old, Justice Yates observed that under it, patent applicants 
are limited to authors and inventors only; this clause, therefore, 
never can admit of so extensive a construction, as to prohibit the 
respective states from exercising the power of securing to persons 
introducing useful inventions (without being the authors or 
inventors) the exclusive benefit of such inventions, for a limited 
time . . . .106 
Chancellor Kent agreed, stating the dominant pre-classical view about 
monopoly grants and economic development: 
[T]he uniform opinion, in England, both before and since the 
statute of James,107 has been, that imported improvements, no less 
than original inventions, ought to be encouraged by 
patent. . . . [To hold otherwise] would be leaving the states in a 
condition of singular and contemptible imbecility. The power is 
important in itself, and may be most beneficially exercised for the 
encouragement of the arts; and if well and judiciously exerted, it 
may ameliorate the condition of society, by enriching and 
adorning the country with useful and elegant improvements.108 
This understanding of patents as inducements to develop or produce was 
hardly an oddity at the time. British patents had also been issued not merely to new 
inventors, but also to those that had migrated an existing manufacture or trade into 
a new area.109 Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures, published in 1791, argued in 
                                                                                                                
machine or other production will have a pernicious effect upon the public 
health or safety, no doubt a competent authority remains with the states 
to restrain the use of the patent right. That species of property must 
likewise be subject to taxation, and to the payment of debts, as other 
personal property. The national power will be fully satisfied, if the 
property created by patent be, for the given time, enjoyed and used 
exclusively, so far as under the policy of the several states the property 
shall be deemed fit for toleration and use. There is no need of giving this 
power any broader construction in order to attain the end for which it was 
granted, which was to reward the beneficent efforts of genius, and to 
encourage the useful arts. 
Id. at 582. 
 106. Id. at 560–61. The New York courts had already agreed, however, that if the 
patent in question had been issued by the United States, then only the federal courts would 
have jurisdiction to adjudicate it. Parsons v. Barnard, 7 Johns. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
 107. See supra note 43 (referring to the 1623 Statute of Monopolies). 
 108. Livingston, 9 Johns. at 584–85. Justice Thompson simply concluded that the 
Patent Clause granted to Congress concurrent rather than exclusive power to issue patents. 
See id. at 563. 
 109. See BUGBEE, supra note 13, at 57–83 (noting difficulties distinguishing patents 
from exclusive corporate privileges in early national period); EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, 
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favor of a system that applied not only to novel inventions, but also to those 
individuals who introduced foreign technology into the United States. Hamilton also 
acknowledged that the new federal Constitution limited patent protection to “authors 
and inventors.” He suggested the possibility that Congress could legislate additional 
protection for noninventing promoters, although its authority to do so—apparently 
under the Commerce Clause—was “not without a question.”110 
State policy of granting patent rights to noninventing developers reflected 
the pre-classical view that exclusive rights were necessary to encourage economic 
development generally, not merely to incentivize invention. That is, capital could 
not be expected to gravitate naturally to those areas that needed it. Exclusivity 
operated not merely as an incentive to develop technology, but also as an incentive 
to migrate technology to a new area. This view of patent law, more than anything 
else, accounts for the difference between Federalists and Whigs such as Hamilton, 
Kent, and Story; and Jacksonian liberals. 
D. Economic Development and Unworked Patents 
Like the monopoly grants created in state-issued corporate charters, early 
patent provisions contemplated actual production under the exclusive rights that 
they permitted. Their purpose was to encourage development, not simply to create 
exclusive rights over technology. The patent grant in the Statute of Monopolies 
conferred the exclusive right on “manufactures,” while the Massachusetts Bodie of 
Liberties limited exclusive privileges to “[i]nventions that are profitable to the 
Country . . . .” Further, the term “invention,” typically used together with the term 
“discovery,” generally referred to the introduction of a new industry into the 
territory. That is, the emphasis was on developing a new industry in a particular area 
rather than developing a technology not previously known.111 By contrast, the 
emergent classical conception of the patent saw it as a narrowly authorized property 
right, given only to inventors and thereafter placed more or less completely under 
the patent owner’s control. 
Many English patents from before the American Revolution had “working 
clauses,” later called “revocation clauses,” which were provisions that required the 
patentee to commercialize the technology covered by the invention.112 Some patents 
specified a number of years during which the patentee must perfect the invention or 
put it into use. Otherwise the patent would lapse or be revoked. Some patent systems 
retained working clauses until well into the twentieth century.113 Obligations to 
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 111. See generally Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 97, at 1–116. 
 112. See E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the 
Prerogative and at Common Law: A Sequel, 16 L. Q. REV. 44 (1900). 
 113. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY, REPORT OF THE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1110, at 378–79, 
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practice, or “work,” the patent were also included in many state patent grants during 
the early national period.114 By contrast, none of the federal patent acts ever included 
a working requirement, except for a short-lived provision enacted in 1832 that 
permitted foreign applicants to receive a U.S. Patent only if they “introduce[d] into 
public use in the United States the invention or improvement within one year from 
the issuing thereof . . . .”115 The provision was removed from the 1836 Act and never 
reappeared.116 
Working clauses were seen as a way of guaranteeing that the public would 
benefit from the grant of an exclusive right prior to the patent’s expiration, as well 
as ensuring that patents would not be deployed so as to retard rather than encourage 
innovation. An unsigned 1882 British editorial in an engineering magazine linked 
the problem of unworked patents to what we today would call “trolls”: “We must 
not do anything that might tend to bring about a system of lying in ambush with 
unworked patents, to spring in due time upon those who actually do something 
practical towards promoting the industrial progress of the country.”117 
The concern was clear: If the patentee did not work the patent, then during 
the period covered by the grant, no one else could do so either. The impact of such 
a patent would be to withdraw its technology or manufacture from service—
precisely the opposite of what was intended. The effect was to put the patent “to 
sleep,” in the words of economist John Maurice Clark.118 Eventually working 
clauses gave way to requirements of disclosure and enablement, which required a 
patent to be sufficiently clear so that another person who read it could replicate the 
invention without undue experimentation.119 The importance of the difference 
should not be lost, however. Patent disclosure and enablement were intended to 
facilitate copying of the innovation by others after the patent expired. Nonuse during 
the patent period could still result in removal of the technology from the market 
during the patent’s life. 
Depending on available remedies, an unused patent manifested not merely 
the patentee’s failure to develop, but also a right to prevent others from developing 
                                                                                                                
Mentalities: National Approaches to the Development of the Chemical Industry in Britain 
and Germany Before 1914, 95, 109–11, in THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE, 1850–1914: 
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH, POLLUTION, AND PROFESSIONALIZATION (Ernst Homburg et al. eds., 
1998). 
 114. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law: 
Antecedents (5, Part II), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665, 669, 681 (1996) (speaking 
of patents granted by Pennsylvania in the 1780s); see also D. Seaborne Davies, The Early 
History of the Patent Specification, 50 L. Q. REV. 86, 95–96 (1934); Fritz Machlup & Edith 
Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950). 
 115. 4 Stat. 577 (1832). 
 116. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378–79 (1945) (discussing the 
provision); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908) (same). 
 117. Patent Law Reform and Sir John Luccock’s Bill, ENGINEERING: AN 
ILLUSTRATED WKLY. J., Apr. 21, 1882, at 378, 409. 
 118. JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 145 
(1923). 
 119. See E. Wyndham Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and 
Present, 13 L. Q. REV. 313, 315–18 (1897). 
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until the patent expired. In the early-nineteenth century United States, a nation 
acutely aware of its undeveloped state, that idea was intolerable. Chancellor Kent 
concluded in his Commentaries that, while the government could not invalidate a 
United States patent simply because it was not being used, the owner could not 
maintain an action against an infringer.120 
In Earle v. Sawyer, written just as the steamboat patent wars were winding 
up, Justice Story also stated his belief that federal law required patents to be 
practiced before they could be enforced, concluding that the federal Patent Act 
protected “not a mere elementary principle, or intellectual discovery, but a principle 
put in practice . . . .”121 As late as 1868, the Supreme Court held that an improvement 
patent that had issued was not enforceable against a subsequent developer of the 
technology when the improvement failed experimental testing and was never 
brought into practice.122 A few years later, the Supreme Court held that a first patent 
was prior art as to a different inventor’s later patent, but only because the first 
patentee had actually reduced the invention to practice by making a working model 
that was viewed by witnesses.123 
The principal nineteenth century patent law treatise writers were not 
entirely consistent on the issue, although overall they favored a practice requirement. 
Willard Phillips, the most prominent patent law writer of the 1830s, insisted that 
reduction to practice was a prerequisite to enforcement. “The subject of a patent 
must be something that has been reduced to practice; it must be something which 
has been actually done or produced,” Phillips concluded in 1837, citing several 
British decisions as well as Justice Story’s Earle decision. Further, “[t]he patent 
being for an invention that is described in it, it is not only requisite that the invention 
should be reduced to practice, but it must be reduced to practice in the way, and 
produce the effect specified.”124 
George Ticknor Curtis, whose 1849 treatise was probably the most 
prominent in nineteenth century American patent law, did not disagree with 
Phillips.125 However, his third edition, which was published in 1867, began to merge 
the practice requirement with enablement, or the idea of “constructive” reduction to 
practice: 
It is not necessary that the invention should have been reduced to 
practice; but unless the description would enable the public, 
without further invention, to put the thing in practice, it cannot be 
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286 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:263 
said that a knowledge of that thing is in the possession of the 
public.126 
In his 1890 treatise, William Callyhan Robinson strongly disagreed, 
declaring that patent law required “nothing less than the actual practice of some art, 
or the construction of some article of manufacture.”127 Robinson expressly rejected 
the view that a detailed written description sufficient to enable someone to make the 
invention was sufficient. Indeed, for Robinson even a “model exhibiting the article 
in all its parts” was insufficient.128 
But Robinson was swimming upstream. Already in 1872 one federal court 
had concluded that a legal rule voiding unworked patents was “wholly unsound” 
because “no such condition is required by the act of congress.”129 The idea of 
“constructive” reduction to practice began appearing in the case law—that is, that a 
patent should be treated as constructively reduced to practice if its disclosure was 
specified sufficiently that a knowledgeable person skilled in the art could implement 
the invention without excessive experimentation.130 
The culmination of classical patent law was that an issued patent was a 
property right completely in the control of its owner, who should be free to use it or 
not at will and also to enjoin infringers. Whether or not the patent’s owner actually 
practiced the patent or licensed it to others became largely irrelevant. The Supreme 
Court embraced this view early in the twentieth century, in two decisions concerning 
the uses of patents in ways that served to limit rather than expand output. In E. 
Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., the Supreme Court upheld a patent cross-
licensing agreement that included a provision fixing the sales price of agricultural 
harrows covered by the patents. In response to the argument that product price fixing 
was not in the public interest, Justice Peckham replied that the patentee’s “title is 
exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in respect of private 
property that he is neither bound to use his discovery himself nor permit others to 
use it.” 131 With that, the Court reasoned that an owner who had the right not to use 
a property interest at all also had the right to fix the price at which the patented 
article could be sold. 
The Court went further six years later in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. 
Eastern Paper Bag Co., concluding that an unpracticed patent was enforceable, and 
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that it entitled the patentee to an injunction against a competing firm.132 The patent 
owner was a dominant manufacturer of paper grocery bags. It was using one type of 
cutter to make its bags but purchased a patent on a different type of cutter from an 
outside inventor. Preferring to stick with its existing technology, the patent owner 
then brought suit against a rival firm whose technology resembled that in the 
acquired but unused patent. Not only did the Supreme Court permit the plaintiff to 
get an injunction shutting down the rival’s technology, but it did so under a 
particularly broad reading of patent law’s doctrine of equivalents, which permits 
infringement claims against technology that do not literally infringe a patent.133 
Even more than Bement, the Paper Bag decision showed how dominant the 
private conception of patent law as a property right had become. The federal district 
court had observed that the patent owner “stands in the common class of 
manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting their 
general industries and shutting out competitors.”134 Nevertheless, it felt obliged to 
issue the injunction. The First Circuit affirmed, but Judge Aldrich wrote a strong 
dissent, complaining that in this case, “a court of equity is asked not to protect from 
infringement the statutorily intended monopoly . . . but to protect a monopoly 
beyond and broader . . . .” Further: 
The proposition involves the idea of a secondary monopoly 
maintained to stifle patent competition in the trades and industries, 
and thus contemplates a condition which at once contravenes the 
manifest purpose of the Constitution, and a monopoly of a kind 
and breadth and for a purpose in no sense ever contemplated by 
the statutory contract which safeguards the legal right to make, 
use, and vend under a particular patent.135 
Nevertheless the Supreme Court concluded: 
The inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is 
his absolute property. He may withhold the knowledge of it from 
the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits 
which the statute promises to him who discloses to the public his 
invention.136 
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Over the subsequent four decades Congress was repeatedly asked to 
overrule or limit the effect of Paper Bag, mainly by providing for either forfeiture137 
or compulsory licensing138 of unused patents. It always declined. 
Paper Bag represents the high point in the Supreme Court’s development 
of patent doctrine based on private property principles, largely indifferent to 
concerns about economic development, growth, or the independent value of 
competition. Under the law of real property, the owner of undeveloped land has no 
duty to sell it to another for development, and she can use an injunction to exclude 
outsiders, no matter how socially beneficial their purpose.139 This was so 
notwithstanding that no federal patent act ever made injunctions automatic. Rather, 
they provided that such suits should be governed by general equitable principles.140 
While the principles were not fully stated in the acts, commonly accepted 
requirements for an injunction were that a remedy at law, or damages, was 
inadequate. Further, the plaintiff had to show that the public interest would not be 
disserved by an injunction.141 Reflecting deep division in thinking about patents as 
absolute property rights or as tools of economic development, the courts initially 
divided on the question of entitlement to an injunction. Some concluded that the 
remedy for infringement actions on unpracticed patents should not be an injunction, 
which would keep the technology off the market altogether,142 while others 
disagreed.143 By approving an injunction restraining infringement of the defendant’s 
unpracticed patent, the Paper Bag decision settled that issue for the time being. 
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E. Patents and Special Interest Capture: The First Sale Doctrine and Substantive 
Due Process 
In Bloomer v. McQuewan, Chief Justice Taney wrote the Supreme Court’s 
opinion limiting the enforcement of patent rights against someone who had 
previously purchased the patented product.144 While the decision is often cited as 
the first statement of patent law’s first-sale, or “exhaustion,” doctrine, Taney was 
pursuing a different purpose. Bloomer tied patent doctrine to Jacksonian concerns 
about retroactivity and special-interest capture, neither of which characterizes the 
patent-exhaustion doctrine today.145 Much more significant than Bloomer’s 
statement of the exhaustion doctrine was its declaration of what later became 
economic substantive due process. 
Bloomer had licensed a patent on a rotary wood-planing machine from its 
inventor, William Woodworth, one of the nineteenth century’s most litigious 
patentees.146 The machine’s ability to smooth all four sides of a wooden board, 
without pulling it to one side as it passed through the device, made it a significant 
contribution to that industry.147 Bloomer authorized others to build the machine with 
a license that limited the number that could be built and their location, as well as the 
licensee’s ability to transfer the machines to others.148 McQuewan’s sublicense from 
Bloomer authorized him to construct and use the machines in Pittsburg and 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.149 
As the patent approached expiration, Woodworth, whose very substantial 
royalties were based on the square feet of surface area that went through the 
machine, lobbied Congress for retroactive extension of the patent term.150 Congress 
responded twice, first with a provision in the 1836 Patent Act extending the patent 
term and making the extension retroactive to cover patents that had already been 
issued.151 Congress’s second response came after Woodworth’s death in 1839, when 
his son lobbied Congress and obtained an additional seven-year retroactive 
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extension that covered only Woodworth’s patent, mentioned by name.152 A federal 
court in Ohio upheld the second extension against a claim that patent terms could 
only be extended by general legislation.153 Using a land analogy, the court reasoned 
that Congress had the power to make different public-land grants to different 
grantees and could grant different parcels for different terms.154 Subsequently, 
however, when Woodworth’s son requested yet another extension there was a large 
public outcry of unfair monopoly.155 McQuewan had paid Bloomer royalties until 
the original patent’s expiration. After the term was extended, Bloomer insisted on 
reviving the royalties and sued for infringement when McQuewan refused to pay. 
The Marshall Court had already effectively upheld both general and special 
retroactivity provisions some 20 years before Taney was appointed to the Court. In 
1815, it approved a federal statute156 that gave another litigious inventor, Oliver 
Evans, a 14-year retroactive term extension on a patent that at least one court had 
already invalidated for lack of invention.157 Then Congress followed that same year 
with a further seven-year extension. The provisions applied retroactively, although 
they contained a damages exemption for infringements that occurred during the 
interval between the expiration of the first patent and the legislation creating the 
second.158 
To a Jacksonian, these retroactive and single-owner term extensions 
represented the worst form of legislative capture, reflecting all of the evils of the 
monopoly bridge franchises and the Contract Clause doctrine that protected them.159 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court rejected Bloomer’s infringement claim. 
The judge-made first sale doctrine that the Court announced did not necessarily 
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condemn all retroactive term extensions. Rather, the Court held that once a patented 
good had been sold under an original patent whose term had expired, the patentee 
could not revive royalty obligations by relying on a subsequent patent term 
extension: “when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer 
within the limits of the monopoly. . . . [The] machine becomes his private individual 
property.”160 As it survives to this day,161 the patent-exhaustion rule does not depend 
for its existence on a legislative term extension. It can apply to a patented article at 
any time after sale. Its effect has been to limit the scope of the patent “monopoly” 
in an area where both the Constitution’s Patent Clause and the Patent Act are 
silent.162 
Chief Justice Taney was also concerned that retroactive patent extensions 
could serve to withdraw a property right from someone who had already purchased 
the patented good in the reasonable expectation that license restrictions would end 
when the patent expired. Here, in one of his most prescient and important utterances, 
Taney invoked the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, very likely because the 
Contract Clause was not available in an action involving a federally created right: 
The right to construct and use these planing machines, had been 
purchased and paid for without any limitation as to the time for 
which they were to be used. They were the property of the 
respondents. Their only value consists in their use. And a special 
act of Congress, passed afterwards, depriving the appellees of the 
right to use them, certainly could not be regarded as due process 
of law.163 
In anticipating substantive due process doctrine, Taney’s discussion 
reflects a deep suspicion of legislative capture and the threat to settled expectations 
in property rights. He might have added that a retroactive term extension, such as 
the Woodworths obtained from Congress, did not serve to incentivize anything, for 
this patent had already been issued. 
Although Taney cited “due process” as the rationale for his decision, the 
facts of Bloomer actually come much closer to the core concerns of Contract Clause 
doctrine than to what became economic substantive due process. Paraphrasing 
Contract Clause language, Taney observed that while Congress had the power to 
grant patents, it did not have the authority to “reinvest in [the patent holder] rights 
of property which he had before conveyed for a valuable and fair consideration.”164 
Taney recited a parade of horribles under which innocent purchasers might acquire 
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goods that are out of patent, but that patent rights could then spring up as a result of 
a retroactive Congressional term extension and limit their usefulness or require 
payment of a royalty.165 The disanalogy was that the challenged term extensions 
came from the federal government rather than a state. Bloomer’s principal concern 
was retroactive legislation that undermined settled expectations in a sale of property 
that had already occurred. That was consistent with the Contract Clause, whose 
adjacent language also barred the states from making ex post facto laws.166 Further, 
the retroactive term extension represented precisely the type of special interest 
generated favoritism for a single patent that the 1836 Patent Act sought to avoid. 
F. Federalism and the Patent “Property” Right 
Under pre-classical conceptions, patents were exclusive privileges granted 
in exchange for a promise to develop economic infrastructure. They were issued, 
supervised, and, if need be, revoked by the same legislative body. A good example 
is the state-issued steamboat patents previously discussed.167 When patents are 
regarded as “property,” however, their character changes. First, the issuance process 
becomes more regularized and ideally removed from the political process. Second, 
the patent owner acquires greater discretion about whether and how the patent will 
be used. Third, as a property right, the patent cannot be revoked at a legislature’s 
behest, but only through judicial process and for cause. 
Management of property rights has traditionally been left to state law, with 
federal law providing occasional limitations. Because patent property is created in 
the first instance by federal law, this division of power is more complex. Federal 
law determines the conditions for issuing a patent and its proper scope. Federal law 
also governs infringement actions, because these involve questions of validity and 
location of boundaries, two parts of the definition of the property right. Except for 
infringement actions, however, state law kicks in after a patent is issued and governs 
most issues of licensing, transfer, and descent. As developed below, the fact that 
federal and not state law governed infringement actions threatened to rob the states 
of control over the use of patented goods. The first sale doctrine served to limit this 
federal authority, in the process ceding greater control to the states. 
Increasingly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court treated patents as a 
species of property, having many of the same constitutional protections as other 
forms of property. For example, it concluded in 1871 that “[i]nventions secured by 
letters patent are property in the holder of the patent, and as such are as much entitled 
to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise, during the term for 
which the franchise or the exclusive right is granted.”168 In its 1888 United States v. 
American Bell Telephone Co. decision, the Supreme Court described the process of 
patent issuance as “quasi judicial” and concluded that once a patent had been issued 
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it could be revoked only by the courts and for cause. The Court relied almost 
exclusively on the law of government grants of land titles, rejecting the patentee’s 
objection that the Court’s “reference[s] exclusively to patents for land . . . are not 
applicable to patents for inventions and discoveries.”169 The Court summarized: 
The patent, then, is not the exercise of any prerogative power or 
discretion by the president, or by any other officer of the 
government, but it is the result of a course of proceeding quasi 
judicial in its character, and is not subject to be repealed or 
revoked by the president, the secretary of the interior, or the 
commissioner of patents, when once issued.170 
The legal structure that emerged gave the federal government a great deal 
of discretion to manage patent issuance, which was controlled entirely by the Patent 
Act. However, once the patent was issued it was transformed into a property right 
with considerable insulation from subsequent regulatory control. Under the U.S. 
Constitution, property rights are so strong that they often take precedence over 
developmental needs. An ironic result was that patent law in the United States—the 
set of legal rules that should be most explicitly concerned with innovation—
developed in relative isolation from economic theories of development or economic 
growth. Patent lawyers disputing patent validity and scope have traditionally 
behaved much more like property lawyers, disputing boundaries rather than, say, 
antitrust lawyers trying to base legal rules on observations about industrial 
performance.171 
G. Federal Law: Patent Eligibility and Scope 
The 1836 Patent Act was passed amid a debate about patent issuance and 
patent quality, with critics protesting that under the then existing registration system, 
far too many weak patents were being issued. The Senate Report concluded that a 
“considerable portion of all the patents granted [were] worthless and void.” It went 
on to explain that patent litigation had been “daily increasing in an alarming degree” 
and was “onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society.”172 
The report concluded that under the existing system: 
The country becomes flooded with patent monopolies, 
embarrassing to bona fide patentees, whose rights are thus 
invaded on all sides; and not less embarrassing to the community 
generally, in the use of even the most common machinery and 
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long-known improvements in the arts and common manufactures 
of the country.173 
The 1836 Patent Act attempted to address these problems by creating the 
modern Patent Office with an appointed commissioner who had the authority to 
appoint one or more “examining clerk[s]” to evaluate applications for 
patentability.174 This examiner looked at each “alleged new invention or discovery” 
to determine whether the thing described in the application “had been invented or 
discovered by any other person in this country prior to the alleged invention or 
discovery thereof by the applicant . . . .”175 In addition, the examiner ensured that 
the subject of the application had not been patented previously or described in a 
printed publication in either the United States or a foreign country, or had not been 
“in public use or on sale with the applicant’s consent or allowance prior to the 
application.”176 Once these conditions for patentability had been satisfied, “it shall 
be [the commissioner’s] duty to issue a patent . . . .”177 If the applicant believed the 
application should have been approved but the Commissioner disagreed, then the 
applicant could take the application to a review panel of “three disinterested persons, 
who shall be appointed for that purpose by the Secretary of State,” and one of whom 
was an expert in the relevant area.178 Final decisions of the panel could be challenged 
in court.179 
The examination process recognized in the 1836 Patent Act and further 
elaborated in the 1870 Act took concerns of economic development almost entirely 
out of the picture. None of the criteria explicitly linked patentability to socially 
productive innovation. While the Act required the commissioner to ensure that the 
alleged invention was “useful,”180 that requirement had largely become meaningless 
and, in any event, never referred to marketability or the filling of an important need, 
things that had been deemed essential to the issuance of early patents.181 Chancellor 
Kent believed that patents had to be “to a cert[ain] degree, beneficial to the 
community, and not injurious, or frivolous, or insignificant.”182 Justice Story, who 
generally favored broad monopoly grants, argued that the utility requirement should 
mean no more than that the invention must not be “frivolous or injurious to the well-
being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”183 Judicial interpretation under the 
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1836 Act increasingly adopted the Story view.184 Increasingly, courts rejected 
inquiries into usefulness in patent validity litigation unless the only functions of the 
challenged device were unlawful or immoral.185 At the same time, applicants 
became entitled to a patent unless the examiner concluded that their patent 
application failed to meet one of the technical criteria for patentability. There was 
no applicant promise to deploy the patented invention and nothing limiting a right 
to bring an infringement suit on an unused patent. Courts applying the statute seldom 
had an opportunity to query whether the patent in question satisfied a perceived 
economic need. 
The 1836 Patent Act also introduced the requirement of patent “claims,” 
which were greatly elaborated in the 1870 Act and Supreme Court decisions. Claims 
became analogous to the “metes and bounds” in a real property deed. They had to 
“particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which 
[the applicant] claim[ed] as his own invention or discovery.”186 Each claim operated 
as a kind of “boundary line,” specifying exactly what the patentee claimed to be new 
and patent-worthy in his invention. The rise and rapid expansion of patent-claiming 
doctrine, already underway in judicial decisions, pulled questions about patent 
validity and scope away from analysis of the central technological contribution of a 
patent and toward the precise location of its boundaries. Today the process is 
described as “peripheral” claiming, emphasizing a patentee’s focus on boundary 
location.187 
In the process, the patent document necessarily became tied to specific 
technologies within the owner’s clear contemplation. For example, the famous 
Morse Telegraph patent case (1853), in which the Supreme Court applied the 1836 
Patent Act, upheld most of the claims for that remarkable invention. Chief Justice 
Taney’s decision for the Supreme Court rejected its infamous eighth claim, however, 
where the Morse patent declared: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts 
of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; 
the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of 
the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, 
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, 
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signs or letters at any distances, being a new application of that 
power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.188 
 As Taney’s opinion recognized, that claim was not tied to any technology 
whatsoever. As a result, it would commandeer future innovations for transmitting 
intelligible characters, “however developed.” Taney complained: 
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or 
machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now 
know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may 
discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of 
the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the 
process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification. His 
invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of 
order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But 
yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor 
the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this 
patentee. 
Nor is this all, while he shuts the door against inventions of other 
persons, the patentee would be able to avail himself of new 
discoveries in the properties and powers of electro-magnetism 
which scientific men might bring to light. For he says he does not 
confine his claim to the machinery or parts of machinery, which he 
specifies; but claims for himself a monopoly in its use, however 
developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance…. And if he 
can secure the exclusive use by his present patent he may vary it 
with every new discovery and development of the science, and 
need place no description of the new manner, process, or 
machinery, upon the records of the patent office. And when his 
patent expires, the public must apply to him to learn what it is.189 
The telegraph decision was thus in sharp contrast to judicial approval of the highly 
general language of the steamboat patents, which said very little more than that they 
applied to all boats propelled by fire or steam.190 
Patent law became more technical, with more strenuous requirements tied 
to disclosure of specific technology that was said to be in the possession of someone 
who could show that he was an “inventor.” In sum, the classical patent would no 
longer be regarded as an inchoate “promise to develop,” implicit in the steamboat 
patents.191 
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An essential part of this transformation was that patent issuance had to 
become a ministerial process, but one in which security of titles could be ensured. 
The Jackson era did the same thing for business corporations by creating general 
incorporation acts that assessed objective criteria for corporate status.192 So too later 
versions of the federal Patent Act objectified the standards for entitlement to a 
patent, in the process removing state-issued patents from the picture. Beginning with 
the 1836 Act, the patent system developed most of its prominent modern features—
mainly, intense scrutiny at the pre-issuance stage by a government official, making 
sure that technical requirements have been met, but very little scrutiny once a patent 
was issued. The patent entered the stream of commerce as a property right, pure and 
simple. Its subsequent use was largely a question for the owner and state commercial 
law. 
H. Regulation of Issued Patents: From State Law to Progressive Federal 
Expansion 
Under the classical conception of the patent, individual states lost the 
power to determine entitlement to a patent or the scope of the patent property right. 
But the Constitution’s Patent Clause authorized Congress only to “secure” the 
exclusive patent right. Once a patent was issued and entered the stream of 
commerce, its management as a property right largely befell the states. That division 
of responsibility has very largely persisted, although with qualifications emanating 
from the first sale doctrine, federal antitrust, and misuse policy. Federal law defines 
entitlement to a patent, its appropriate scope, and enforcement power by means of 
infringement actions. By contrast, state commercial law determines questions about 
licensing, assignment, and descent.193 
1. State Patent Regulation 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie v. Tompkins, the line between 
federal and state law was often indistinct, particularly where the rule of commercial 
law in question was thought to be “general” as opposed to “local,” and came from 
the common law.194 The federal courts had no obligation to defer to state law but 
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rather followed the general law, or their own view of the best law on the subject.195 
A case in point is Brooks v. Byam, decided by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story 
while he was riding circuit in Massachusetts.196 Brooks came only a year after Justice 
Story’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson, which first established the 
“general law” rule for the federal courts.197 The question in Brooks was whether a 
license to practice a patent on friction matches could be subdivided among six 
different sublicensees independently, who could then practice the patent in 
competition with one another. Justice Story first observed that the federal Patent Act 
did not speak to the issue.198 He then looked to the general common law and applied 
the ancient British rule in Mountjoy’s Case, which held that a license to take sod and 
gravel could not be subdivided among different users unless the users committed to 
operate it jointly as “one stock,” or effectively as a partnership.199 
No state statute addressed the issue either, and Justice Story did not say 
whether the presence of such a statute would have affected the outcome. 
Increasingly after the 1870s, however, the federal courts began to defer to state 
statutes regulating the assignment and licensing of patent rights, provided that the 
statutes did not interfere with the federal prerogative to secure the rights in the first 
place. 
For example, the courts upheld state statutes expanding the Statute of 
Frauds by requiring transfers of patents to be in writing, as federal patent law already 
required, but also to authenticate or provide evidence of patent ownership.200 The 
courts were more divided on state statutes that limited the negotiability of 
promissory notes used in purchase of patent rights unless the note clearly stated that 
the underlying consideration was a patent.201 Some courts viewed these statutes as 
indicating that, while a patent was a form of property, it was less secure than tangible 
property rights. As a result, a bona fide assignee of a promissory note had a right to 
know that the underlying interest was a patent rather than real or tangible personal 
property whose title was less likely to be disputed. As one Michigan decision 
striking down such a statute observed: 
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The plain and avowed purpose of the statute of 1871 is to impose 
conditions on the transfer of patent rights, which do not apply to 
any other kinds of property, thereby interfering with the value and 
enjoyment of such rights, and treating them as a species of 
interests to be regarded with disfavor.202 
However, the court continued, questions concerning the validity of federal 
patent rights were for Congress and “that body alone” to determine.203 
In 1906, the Supreme Court confirmed the general division between federal 
and state law on questions of post-issuance commerce. Allen v. Riley upheld a state 
statute requiring copies of a patent and affidavits of genuineness to be attached to 
any commercial transfer of patent rights.204 Justice Peckham’s opinion for the 
Supreme Court distinguished a hypothetical state statute that prevented the transfers 
of federal patent rights, which would be in conflict with federal law, from the actual 
statute, which did no more than police fraud.205 “There is great opportunity for 
imposition and fraud in the transfer of intangible property, such as exists in a patent 
right, and many states have prescribed regulations for the transfer of such property 
differing essentially from those which control the transfer of other property.”206 
Another area where the Patent Act left considerable room for state 
regulation concerned the immoral or unsafe uses of patented products or processes. 
As noted previously,207 while the federal Patent Act assessed “usefulness” as a 
requirement for patent eligibility, the requirement was soon watered down to refer 
only to things that had no purpose other than illegality or immorality. Beyond that, 
the regulation of patented goods on grounds of safety or immorality largely befell 
the states. In the early leading decision, Vannini v. Paine, the defendant had what is 
best described as a business method patent on a system for drawing lottery 
numbers.208 The decision came down during the high tide of Jacksonian evangelical 
fervor against lotteries.209 The Delaware legislature had already determined that 
lotteries were “pernicious and destructive to frugality and industry and introductive 
of idleness and immorality.” As a result, the court held it could not “be admitted that 
the [plaintiffs] have a right to use an invention for drawing lotteries in this State, 
merely because they have a patent for it under the United States.”210 In its 1878 
Patterson v. Kentucky decision, the Supreme Court held the defendant’s patent on a 
particular fuel oil did not suffice to defend against a state statute that prohibited use 
of the oil because its burning temperature was unsafely low.211 Dicta in Justice 
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Field’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Webber illustrated the rationale and limit 
for this power in the states: 
The patent for a dynamite powder does not prevent the State from 
prescribing the conditions of its manufacture, storage, and sale, so 
as to protect the community from the danger of explosion. A 
patent for the manufacture and sale of a deadly poison does not 
lessen the right of the State to control its handling and use.212 
2. The Classical Patent in Decline: Federalism, the First Sale Doctrine, and the 
Invasion of Competition Law 
Both federal and state law potentially reached post-issuance patent 
restraints that were thought to be anticompetitive. The Sherman Antitrust Act had 
been passed in 1890, but it made no mention of patents and played only a minor role 
in policing anticompetitive patent practices prior to the 1920s. The principal 
exception was the government antitrust prosecution of the Standard Sanitary cartel 
in 1912. The Court agreed that a market-wide cartel in enameled ironware such as 
bathroom sinks could not defend by showing that the price-fixing agreement was 
contained in a patent license covering the enameling process.213 
But federal antitrust was not the only source of competition law. In Pope 
Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, the Supreme Court refused to enforce on equitable 
grounds an exclusive dealing agreement—in this case, the promise by a 
licensee/manufacturer of bicycles that it would not import or sell any patented 
bicycles produced by competitors.214 The Court did not mention the Sherman Act, 
which had passed two years earlier, and the doctrine of patent “misuse” was still 
decades in the future. Then, in 1907 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states the power to regulate practices 
such as exclusive dealing when contained in patent licenses.215 While the Patent Acts 
have authorized patentees to issue exclusive licenses, they did not authorize 
exclusive dealing. The distinction is important. An exclusive license benefits the 
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licensee by creating a commitment that the patentee will not license a competitor to 
practice the patent in the area covered by the exclusivity provision. By contrast, 
exclusive dealing limits the power of a licensee to obtain competing goods for resale, 
whether patented or not, from someone else. 
Closely related to exclusive dealing was tying, or the patentee’s 
requirement that a licensee could practice a patent only by using it with additional 
goods (whether patented or unpatented) purchased from the patentee. Both practices 
were thought to make downstream markets less competitive by limiting the range of 
products that resellers could sell. Several cases arose around the time the Sherman 
Act was passed, but that statute’s condemnation of agreements “in restraint of trade” 
said nothing specific about tying and exclusive dealing. Further, there was very little 
case law suggesting that either practice restrained trade at common law. As a result, 
the Sherman Act played almost no role in the development of tying law prior to the 
1930s except for a brief mention in Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co., which cited the Sherman Act as an alternative ground for 
refusing to enforce a tying requirement in a patent license.216 
The Supreme Court first refused to enforce a patent tie in 1894, but relied 
on the first sale doctrine and did not mention the Sherman Act.217 In Morgan 
Envelope Co., the patentee sold its patented toilet paper dispenser subject to a license 
agreement requiring the purchaser to use only its own unpatentable toilet paper. The 
Court concluded that once the patentee sold the device the purchaser was free to use 
it with or without the patentee’s paper. The Court quoted an earlier first sale 
decision, which had not involved tying, for the proposition that the first sale doctrine 
was intended to divide the territory between federal and state law: 
When the patented machine rightfully passes to the hands of the 
purchaser from the patentee, or from any other person authorized 
to convey it, the machine is no longer within the limits of the 
monopoly. * * * By a valid sale and purchase, the patented 
machine becomes the private individual property of the purchaser, 
and is no longer protected by the laws of the United States, but by 
the laws of the state in which it is situated.218 
The first sale doctrine in patent law is entirely judge made, and its rationale 
has always been mysterious and controversial. Some have argued that it was 
designed in furtherance of a policy about competition,219 others that it represents an 
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unjustified interference in freedom of contract,220 and others still that it was simply 
an exercise in statutory interpretation, which includes an assessment of the patent’s 
appropriate domain.221 But the doctrine also clearly played an important role in 
dividing the territory between federal patent law and competition law, whether 
federal or state.222 
Nineteenth century courts often viewed the doctrine as policing the line 
between federal law, which governed patent issuance, and state law, which governed 
patent use as well as the use of patented products. Writing in 1904, Albert Henry 
Walker, author of the most prominent of early twentieth century patent treatises, 
observed that: 
The reason why a State has complete power of regulation over the 
sale of the patented thing, and is restricted in its power of 
regulation over the sale of the patent covering that thing, is 
explainable as follows: A patentee has two kinds of rights in his 
invention. He has a right to make, use, and sell specimens of the 
invented thing; and he has a right to prevent all other persons from 
doing either of those acts. The first of these rights is wholly 
independent of the patent laws; while the second exists by virtue 
of those laws alone. A patentee therefore holds the first of these 
rights subject not only to the police powers, but to the taxing 
powers, of the State, and to the law regulating common carriers; 
while the second, being the creation of the laws of Congress, is 
wholly beyond state control or interference by antitrust laws, or 
otherwise.223 
When the first sale doctrine applied, tying, exclusive dealing, resale price 
maintenance, and other patent licensing practices would not be preemptively 
approved as a matter of federal patent law. Rather, nonpatent statutory and common 
law made by the states would be left to control these practices. Then-Sixth Circuit 
Judge Horace H. Lurton initially exposed this problem in the Button-Fastener 
decision in 1896, which led to the Progressive critique that eventually federalized 
the law of exclusive dealing and tying. The Button-Fastener defendant made a 
patented machine that fastened button hooks to garments. A license restriction 
required purchasers to use the patentee’s own button hooks exclusively.224 The court 
refused to apply the first sale doctrine for the technical reason that the doctrine did 
not apply to “conditional” sales. 
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The court acknowledged that regulation of the way a patented article is 
used is within “the police power of the states.”225 Nevertheless, a state statute that 
forbad tying under these circumstances would be in direct conflict with its rule that 
the tying requirement could be enforced by a contributory infringement suit. 
“Contributory” infringement refers to the act of selling an article knowing that it will 
be used to commit patent infringement.226 A state statute condemning tying would 
have prohibited the very thing that the Patent Act required. In that case, the 
Supremacy Clause provided that the patent infringement suit would control and state 
law would not apply. 
Justice Lurton recognized this difficulty 16 years later in Henry v. A.B. 
Dick, Co., which was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. By that time, 
he had been appointed to the Supreme Court by his former Sixth Circuit Colleague, 
President William Howard Taft. He wrote the opinion in Henry as well.227 The facts 
resembled those of the Button case, although in a different technology. A.B. Dick, a 
large manufacturer of office equipment, sold a mimeograph machine with a license 
restriction requiring purchasers of the machine to use its ink, paper, and stencils. 
When Sidney Henry sold a can of a competitor’s ink to a user of the machine the 
patentee brought an action for contributory infringement, which the Supreme Court 
sustained. This time Justice Lurton’s opinion for the Court observed that the 
question of tying of patented products was not addressed by the Patent Act. Nor was 
it prohibited by the Sherman Act, which did not reach monopolies created by 
patent.228 However, writing against the background of then existing substantive due 
process law, Lurton noted that state law would permit intervention in a lawfully 
made contract only if the practice in question affected health or public safety, and 
he could not see how a tying arrangement had such an effect.229 In any event, Lurton 
observed, state law would not have the power to undo a federally recognized action 
for patent infringement.230 At the same time, he rejected the argument that the rule 
he was adopting constituted “an encroachment upon the authority of the state courts 
and an extension of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.”231 In sum, Henry 
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indicated not only that a tying arrangement by means of a patent license restriction 
was enforceable, but that such an action would override conflicting state law. 
Henry’s critics argued that the Supreme Court was overlooking the fact that 
a patentee could use a tie to create a second monopoly in an unpatented article, and 
that the Patent Act provided no such authority.232 In any event, the Congressional 
reaction was swift and strong. Seeking to strike at both the previously discussed 
Paper Bag decision233 and Henry, Senator William Oldfield from Arkansas offered 
a bill amending the Patent Act by requiring compulsory licensing of any patent that 
was not being practiced within four years of issuance.234 A second section provided 
that one who purchased a patented article was free to use it with unpatented 
complementary products without restriction. 235 
Congress’s actual response was somewhat different. In 1914 it amended 
the antitrust laws rather than the Patent Act.236 Section 3 of the Clayton Act237 did 
nothing about refusals to license unpracticed patents. However, it did limit tying and 
exclusive dealing. The provision applied to both sales and leases, thus reaching 
further than the first sale doctrine, and also to goods “whether patented or 
unpatented.” Finally, it did not create a per se prohibition, but rather condemned 
tying and exclusive dealing only “where the effect . . . may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”238 
The Supreme Court promptly reversed course, overruling Henry and 
condemning a patent tie in the 1917 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
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Manufacturing Co. case.239 The Court acknowledged that the newly passed Clayton 
Antitrust Act “confirmed” its conclusion to refuse to enforce the tie,240 and it never 
referenced state law. Thereafter it proceeded on an expansionist course that 
significantly federalized the law of patent licensing when the license agreements 
were thought to be anticompetitive or asserted patentee power “beyond the scope” 
of the patent.241 In 1931, it refused to enforce a patent license tying dry ice, a 
common unpatented commodity, to the defendant’s refrigerator boxes.242 In 1936, it 
condemned IBM’s tie of patented computers to patented data-processing cards—the 
machines were leased, so the first sale doctrine did not apply.243 Sixteen years later 
it created a virtual per se rule against tying arrangements when one of the products 
in question was patented.244 In the 1960s, it refused to enforce a license agreement 
requiring royalty payments that extended beyond the patent’s expiration date—a 
rule that the Supreme Court affirmed in 2015 on stare decisis grounds.245 
In sum, the first sale doctrine limited the ability of patentees to impose 
license restrictions under the Patent Act preemptively, effectively opening the door 
for state law that might wish to condemn these restrictions. The expansion of 
antitrust law subsequent to the passage of the Clayton Act federalized this power, 
expanding it to leases and other transactions where the first sale doctrine would not 
ordinarily apply. Under both federal and state law, tying, exclusive dealing and 
resale price maintenance all became independently unlawful, and it did not matter 
whether the restrictions were in a patent license. The emergent federal doctrine of 
patent “misuse” performed largely the same function, except within Patent Law and 
even when no federal or state statute was on point.246 The classical patent had begun 
to crumble. 
CONCLUSION: PATENTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Whether property or not, one distinguishing historical feature of patents is 
their explicit constitutional rationale as an instrument of economic growth. The 
Patent Clause gave Congress the authority to create a patent system in order to 
“promote the Progress of science and useful Arts.”247 But policies about 
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development and the state’s role in furthering it changed over time. Patent protection 
thought sufficient in one period was seen as inadequate or excessive in another. 
Today the patent system has been the subject of significant empirical analysis, much 
of which has either questioned the wisdom of patents in some markets or determined 
that different markets should have different amounts or types of protection.248 By 
contrast, property rights tend to create ratchets, permitting interests to be expanded 
but not contracted without compensation to their owners. This is in sharp contrast to 
antitrust law, which is also concerned with economic development but has never 
given its protections or liabilities the status of property rights. As a result, antitrust 
rules expand and contract over time without compensation to those who are injured 
by the changes. 
Mid-nineteenth century changes in U.S. patent law were heavily driven by 
classical beliefs that monopoly is bad and generally unnecessary for economic 
growth, with invention as a narrow exception. This entailed, first, that the conditions 
for obtaining a patent be narrow, limited to actual inventions within the applicant’s 
possession, and adequately disclosed. Second, the system had to be made 
nondiscretionary and free from capture. Individual patent grants were no longer a 
matter of legislative prerogative. Rather, the applicant was entitled to a patent if he 
could make specific showings concerning prior technology and use. The “prior art” 
queries that increasingly dominated patentability doctrine focused on what had been 
available in the past, rather than what economic development might require for the 
future. Finally, once a patent was issued the government abandoned much of its 
interest. The patent entered commerce as personal property, creating individual 
rights but few social obligations. Together these requirements led both Congress and 
the courts away from relatively open-ended policy concerns and toward technical 
specification and boundary clarity. The result was a patent system increasingly 
detached from questions about economic development. 
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